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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is the only known QKD
scheme that can completely overcome the problem of detection side-channel attacks. Yet, despite
its practical importance, there is no standard approach towards proving the security of MDI-QKD.
Here, we present a simple numerical method that can efficiently compute almost-tight security
bounds for any discretely modulated MDI-QKD protocol. To demonstrate the broad utility of
our method, we use it to analyze the security of coherent-state MDI-QKD, decoy-state MDI-QKD
with leaky sources, and a variant of twin-field QKD called phase-matching QKD. In all of the
numerical simulations (using realistic detection models) we find that our method gives significantly
higher secret key rates than those obtained with current security proof techniques. Interestingly, we
also find that phase-matching QKD using only two coherent test states is enough to overcome the
fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD. Taken together, these findings suggest that our security
proof method enables a versatile, fast, and possibly optimal approach towards the security validation
of practical MDI-QKD systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an emerging quan-
tum technology that enables the exchange of crypto-
graphic keys in an untrusted network [1, 2]. The key
feature of the technology is that it is provably secure.
More specifically, its security [3] is based solely on the
laws of quantum mechanics and not on how powerful the
adversary could be. For this reason, secret keys generated
by QKD systems can be safely used in any cryptographic
applications which require long-term security assurance.
A hugely popular QKD configuration is the prepare-
and-measure (P&M) scheme. As its name suggest, P&M-
QKD involves the preparation of a quantum state that
is randomly drawn from a pre-agreed set of states by the
protagonist, whom we call Alice. Then, she will send
the prepared state to her distant associate, whom we call
Bob, to be measured in a basis that is randomly drawn
from a pre-agreed set. Since Eve could not perfectly dis-
criminate the traversing signals, any attempt to learn its
identity will inevitably modify the quantum state itself.
Thus, the secrecy of the secret key is guaranteed by quan-
tum theory and such is the main appeal of QKD.
Despite the rigorous mathematical validation of QKD,
present physical implementations of QKD are vulnera-
ble to numerous side-channel attacks. In particular, it
was demonstrated that the adversary could exploit the
imperfections of single-photon detectors to steal some in-
formation about the secret key without introducing noise
into the quantum channel [4–9]. Consequently, these
demonstrations necessitate the search for a QKD proto-
col that is robust against detection side-channel attacks:
the measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD)
∗ ign.william@gmail.com
[10, 11].
The MDI-QKD scheme (see Fig. 1) requires both Al-
ice and Bob to each prepare a quantum state, which, like
the P&M scheme, is randomly drawn from a pre-agreed
set of states, to be sent to a potentially untrusted node
connecting them. Ideally, the node will perform a Bell-
state measurement jointly on the prepared states, whose
outcome will determine if both Alice and Bob will keep
the indices of the prepared quantum states for key dis-
tillation. This process is equivalent to a protocol where
Alice and Bob each prepares a bipartite entangled state
and measuring a part of it [12] while sending the other
to the node for entanglement swapping. Hence, it is as
though Alice and Bob are making local measurements on
a shared entangled state. Subsequently, Alice and Bob
would sample their bit strings to evaluate their security
against any potential adversary. Such security analysis
is made assuming that Eve has full access and control
of the node, and hence, any attack based on imperfect
detectors is part of the untrusted quantum channel.
An innovation is only as good as its feasibility and
the same applies to QKD protocols. With practical-
ity in mind, MDI-QKD was specifically designed to be
implementable with existing hardware, differentiating it-
self from other QKD protocols. Although the security
of MDI-QKD relies mainly on instances when single-
photon states are transmitted from Alice and Bob to the
node, employing the decoy-state method [13] gives good
security performances using phase-randomized coherent
states as signals. Due to its merits, efforts to progress
MDI-QKD were made on both theoretical [14–20] and
experimental [21–30] fronts.
Evolving from the original protocol, MDI-QKD could
also be performed with coherent states without phase
randomization and hence the decoy-state method. In
this case, Alice and Bob encode the key information in
the phases of the coherent states. The modified pro-
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FIG. 1. Virtual protocol for arbitrary MDI-QKD protocols. To prove the security of an MDI-QKD protocol, we consider
a virtual protocol, which from the point of view of the adversary is equivalent to the actual protocol. Since the adversary could
not distinguish if Alice and Bob are performing the actual or virtual protocol, the security of both protocols are equal. However,
performing security proof on the virtual protocol is much easier and hence, we consider this virtual protocol. In this virtual
protocol, (i’ ) Alice and Bob each prepares an entangled state which can be steered into the signal states of the real protocol.
Furthermore, we can choose the entangled state such that one part of the entangled state is a qubit which is kept in each
party’s quantum memory. (ii’ ) Then, the other part of the entangled states, namely system A and B, are sent through the
quantum channel to the central node. (iii’ ) When the central node performs a successful Bell state projection, Alice’s qubit
is now entangled with that of Bob due to entanglement swapping. As such, one can see the virtual protocol as a procedure of
distributing entangled qubit pairs to Alice and Bob. Then, one can use the techniques for entanglement-based QKD to prove
the security of MDI-QKD.
tocol can be proven secure using the so-called quantum
coin method (refer to Appendix B) [15], which was based
on earlier research in P&M-QKD with imperfect devices
[31]. However, it is not known if this approach would
lead to optimal secret key rates as most security proofs
provide only a lower bound on the amount of extractable
secret keys without proving that such lower bound can-
not be improved upon.
Here, we introduce a versatile, fast and almost-tight
method to prove the security of discretely modulated
MDI-QKD [32]. This technique is based on the obser-
vation that the Gram matrix of Eve’s quantum side in-
formation [33] translates to the characterization of Eve’s
attack in a compact way (refer to section II for more
details). This allows us to compute the phase error di-
rectly, which makes our method almost-tight, as com-
pared to the pessimistic estimation obtained using exist-
ing technique [15]. We apply this characterization tech-
nique to three different types of MDI-QKD protocols: (1)
the original polarization (or time-phase) encoding decoy-
state MDI-QKD [10], (2) phase-encoding MDI-QKD us-
ing non-phase-randomized coherent states [15], and (3)
a variant of twin-field QKD [34] called phase-matching
MDI-QKD [35]. The proposed proof technique demon-
strates significant advantages over the known bounds on
secret key rates for all of the considered MDI-QKD pro-
tocols.
II. METHOD
In this section, we outline a general security analy-
sis procedure that works for any MDI-QKD protocol,
provided the encoded states are pure and their inner-
products are known. In practice, one can characterize the
encoded states by performing state tomography and thus
their inner-products can be easily obtained. For simplic-
ity, we only consider security against collective attacks
in the asymptotic limit in this paper. To extend our re-
sult to security against coherent attacks in the finite-key
regime, we can apply the post-selection technique [36] or
the entropy accumulation theorem [37, 38].
Suppose the states that Alice prepares are
{|a(ax)〉A}ax and those prepared by Bob are {|b(by)〉B}by
where a and b are the bit values while x and y are the
basis choices of Alice and Bob respectively. Furthermore,
3Alice’s and Bob’s quantum encoding, denoted by |a(·)〉
and |b(·)〉 respectively, can be different in general.
We denote the inner-product of the code states by
Λaxby,a′x′b
′
y′
= 〈a(ax)|a(a′x′)〉A〈b(by)|b(b′y′)〉B . Note that
Λaxby,a′x′b
′
y′
could be complex.
Since the joint input states are pure, we can describe
the quantum channel and the untrusted measurement by
the central node as a quantum-to-classical map. Such
maps can be described by an isometry U acting on the
input states giving
|a(ax)〉A|b(by)〉B
U−→
∑
z
∣∣∣ezaxby〉
E
|z〉E′ (1)
where z is the classical announcement made by the cen-
tral node. For concreteness, we consider the case where
z ∈ {pass, fail}, which indicates whether the Bell state
measurement is successful or not, however, our method
allows for other announcements by the central node, such
as the actual result of the Bell state measurement. The
vectors {|ezaxby 〉E}ax,by,z are sub-normalized states cor-
responding to the quantum side information that Eve
holds. Now, one can construct a Gram matrix G for the
adversary’s quantum side information and it is clear that
such matrix is positive semi-definite, i.e., G  0.
Moreover, since the channel is described by an isomet-
ric transformation, the inner-product information is pre-
served at the output states as well. More specifically, we
have the following constraint on the Gram matrix G:
Λaxby,a′x′b
′
y′
= 〈a(ax)|a(a′x′)〉A
〈
b(by)
∣∣b(b′y′)〉B
=
∑
z
〈
ezaxby
∣∣∣eza′
x′b
′
y′
〉
E
(2)
Furthermore, other observable constraints such as the
bit-error rate and the probability of a successful Bell
state measurement can be expressed in terms of linear
constraints on the Gram matrix. For example, the prob-
ability of successful Bell state measurement when Alice
and Bob both choose the basis γ, denoted by P γpass, is
given by
P γpass =
∑
a,b
P (aγ , bγ)
fγ
P (pass|aγ , bγ)
=
∑
a,b
P (aγ , bγ)
fγ
〈
epassaγbγ
∣∣∣epassaγbγ〉E (3)
where fγ is the probability of Alice and Bob both choos-
ing the γ basis and P (aγ , bγ) is the joint probability that
Alice chooses aγ and Bob chooses bγ . Similarly, the bit-
error rate in the γ basis, denoted by eγbit, can be expressed
as
eγbit = P (a 6= b|pass, x = y = γ)
=
∑
a 6=b
P (aγ , bγ)
P γpassfγ
P (pass|aγ , bγ)
=
∑
a 6=b
P (aγ , bγ)
P γpassfγ
〈
epassaγbγ
∣∣∣epassaγbγ〉E (4)
where the first equality is from the definition of bit-error
rate and the second equality can be easily obtained by
applying Bayes rule.
Now, to prove the security of the protocol, we consider
a virtual protocol illustrated in Fig. 1. Since the adver-
sary could not distinguish if Alice and Bob are perform-
ing the actual or virtual protocol, the security of both
protocols are equal. However, performing security proof
on the virtual protocol is much easier and hence, we con-
sider this virtual protocol. For concreteness, we suppose
that Alice and Bob extract secret key from the K basis
and they use the T basis (which is mutually-unbiased to
K) to estimate Eve’s information. Note that these bases
are defined in the virtual protocol and not in the actual
protocol. In this virtual protocol, to generate secret key,
Alice and Bob first prepare the entangled states
|ΨK〉A′A =
1√
2
[∑
a
|aK〉A′ |a(aK)〉A
]
|Ψ′K〉B′B =
1√
2
[∑
b
|bK〉B′ |b(bK)〉B
]
(5)
where the systems A′ and B′ are qubits. From the point
of view of Eve, this is equivalent to the actual protocol
since after tracing out systems A′ and B′, the marginal
states are the same as if Alice and Bob prepare the states
|a(aK)〉A and |b(bK)〉B randomly based on the random
bit a and b given by their random number generator.
Furthermore, Alice and Bob can obtain the random bit
a and b, simply by measuring systems A′ and B′ in the
K basis.
After the central node successfully performs a Bell
state projection, the qubit-qubit system A′B′ are now
entangled due to the entanglement swapping [39][40, 41]
operation. Depending on the outcome of the Bell state
measurement z, Bob will need to perform a local unitary
IA′ ⊗ UB′(z) to rotate the state into the target state.
Then, to estimate the side information that Eve has, Al-
ice and Bob can measure the systems A′ and B′ respec-
tively in the T basis. This will give Alice and Bob the
so-called phase-error rate eph in their virtual qubit-qubit
system. Shor and Preskill [42] proved that, for this type
of QKD protocol, the lower bound on the asymptotic se-
cret key rate is given by
R ≥ PKpass
[
1− h2(eph)− h2(ebit)
]
(6)
where h2(·) is the binary entropy function.
At this point, a few remarks are in order. Firstly, the
measurement in the T basis when Alice and Bob prepare
the entangled states |ΨK〉A′A and |Ψ′K〉B′B are counter-
factual measurements that are not performed in the ac-
tual protocol. The actual test states that Alice and Bob
send are {|a(aT )〉A}a and {|b(bT )〉B}b whose virtual ana-
logue is measuring the qubit systems of some other en-
tangled states |ΨT 〉A′A and |Ψ′T 〉B′B in the T basis. As
such, the phase-error rate eph is not accessible in the ac-
tual protocol. However, Alice and Bob can employ the
4knowledge of the test states (i.e., the inner-product infor-
mation), the observed error rate, and the success proba-
bility to constrain the virtual protocol phase-error rate,
eph, as we will show later.
Secondly, like the bit-error rate ebit, the phase-error
rate eph is also a linear function of the Gram matrix G.
The explicit expression of eph, in general depends on the
choice of entangled state that Alice and Bob prepares,
the virtual measurements that steer the states, as well as
the target state of the qubit pairs shared between Alice
and Bob. As an example, the procedure to obtain the
explicit expression for eph in the phase-encoding MDI-
QKD protocol is outlined in Appendix A.
With all these in mind, here is the crucial observation.
The Gram matrix G depends on the isometry U per-
formed by Eve. Secondly, the constraints on the Gram
matrix G, imposed by the inner-product information and
the observed statistics, are linear. Moreover, one can ob-
tain a lower bound on the secret key rate R by obtaining
an upper bound on the phase-error rate eph, which is a
linear objective function, allowing us to use semi-definite
programming (SDP) techniques to completely character-
ize Eve’s strategies. This will be explained in more details
in section III.
Lastly, to show that our method gives a tighter lower
bound on the key rate as compared to the quantum coin
approach, we will analyze MDI-QKD protocols based on
coherent states and Trojan horse attacks. These are the
scenarios in which the quantum coin approach was used
in the literature. The outcomes of the simulation are
presented in section IV.
III. CHARACTERIZING EVE’S STRATEGY
USING SEMI-DEFINITE PROGRAMMING
SDP is a class of convex optimization problem with
a linear objective function over a cone of positive semi-
definite matrices [43]. One can think of such optimiza-
tion problem as linear programming with linear matrix
inequalities as constraints. Just like any other optimiza-
tion problems, we can define the primal problem and the
dual problem of an SDP. If the primal problem is a mini-
mization problem, then its dual would be a maximization
problem and vice versa. Furthermore, if the primal prob-
lem is a maximization problem, then the weak duality
theorem states that the optimal primal value p∗ and the
optimal dual value d∗ satisfy the following relationship
p∗ ≤ d∗ (7)
and the opposite is true if the primal problem is a min-
imization problem. When p∗ = d∗, we say that strong
duality holds and it implies that p∗ = d∗ is the optimal
solution to the SDP.
Previously, there have been other numerical ap-
proaches to security analysis of QKD [16, 17, 44]. One
of the appeals of such numerical approaches is that they
are highly versatile and can be used to analyze a wide
range of QKD protocols without relying on the specific
structure of the underlying design. Here we propose an
SDP-based technique of analyzing the security of MDI-
QKD that is versatile, simple and almost-tight. The
notion of almost-tight refers to the obtained upper and
lower bounds on the phase error, eph, coincide up to some
numerical precision, which is inherent to any numerical
methods.
Despite also approaching the security analysis nu-
merically, we emphasize that our method is conceptu-
ally distinct from previous methods presented in Refs.
[16, 17, 44]. In Refs. [16, 17], one would lower bound the
secret key rate by bounding the von Neumann entropies
in the Devetak-Winter bound [45] directly. In Ref. [16],
this was done by applying the Golden-Thompson inequal-
ity to make the problem more manageable, whereas in
Ref. [17], one would have to find an almost-optimal at-
tack by the eavesdropper and then linearize the objective
function and solve the optimization problem using SDP.
For Ref. [44], one bound the phase-error rate instead of
the von Neumann entropy. This was done by introduc-
ing a hierarchy of semi-definite relaxations that bounds
the set of quantum correlations from outside and express
the phase-error rate as a linear objective function. Once
a linear objective function is obtained, one can use any
SDP solver to obtain the secret key rate.
Like Ref. [44], our method computes the secret key
rate by bounding the phase-error rate eph. Our method
exploits the fact that the Gram matrix G is both positive
semi-definite and linearly constrained. As such, obtain-
ing an upper bound to the phase-error rate is equivalent
to solving the dual problem of an SDP. In other words,
the solution of the SDP characterizes the optimal attack
that Eve can perform on the quantum channel and with
the untrusted central node. Thus, the security analysis
of any MDI-QKD protocol is equivalent to solving the
following SDP
maximize eph
s.t G  0
eph ≤ 1/2
P γpass =
∑
a,b
P (aγ , bγ)
fγ
〈
epassaγbγ
∣∣∣epassaγbγ〉E
eγbit =
∑
a6=b
P (aγ , bγ)
P γpassfγ
〈
epassaγbγ
∣∣∣epassaγbγ〉E
Λaxby,a′x′b
′
y′
=
∑
z
〈
ezaxby
∣∣∣eza′
x′b
′
y′
〉
E
(8)
where γ is the basis choice of Alice and Bob and eph is a
linear function of the Gram matrix G, which is protocol
dependent. In order to obtain a reliable upper bound on
eph, one has to optimize the dual problem of optimiza-
tion (8).
Furthermore, due to the weak duality theorem, any
feasible solution of the dual problem gives a reliable up-
per bound on the phase-error rate. Moreover, when the
strong duality condition holds, our upper bound on the
5phase-error rate is tight. Remarkably, in practice, the
duality gap (the difference between the primal and dual
value) is usually very small. Hence, our upper bound on
the phase-error rate is almost tight, even when the strong
duality condition is not met.
Drawing the connection to the isometry U performed
by the eavesdropper, since the Gram matrix characterizes
U , solving the SDP (8) is equivalent to finding the isom-
etry that gives Eve the maximum knowledge about the
bits that Alice and Bob possess, considering the statis-
tics that Alice and Bob observe. Lastly, we remark that
SDPs can be efficiently solved with standard solvers that
are readily accessible. Therefore, our method can be im-
plemented easily even with personal computers (which is
the case for the simulations presented in this work).
At this point, we highlight a few differences between
our method and other numerical methods that have been
proposed previously. Firstly, our method does not rely
on any semi-definite relaxation unlike Ref. [44]. It is also
important to note that Ref. [44] did not formulate any
framework to apply their technique to MDI-QKD. More-
over, compared to the methods of Refs. [16, 17], which
involves nonlinear optimization, our method has signif-
icant advantage in terms of computational time. This
gives a practical appeal when one use the numerical tool-
box for optimization of protocol parameters. Addition-
ally, the application of Golden-Thompson inequality in
Ref. [16] may affect the convexity of the optimization
problem when the inequality is strict. This can affect
both the efficiency and optimality of the method as the
algorithm might yield a locally optimal result instead of
the global one.
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we apply our technique to coherent
state based protocols, namely the phase-encoding coher-
ent state MDI-QKD [15] and a variant of the recently pro-
posed twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) protocol [34], as well
as the decoy-state protocols [10] with Trojan horse at-
tacks. We also analyze these protocols with the quantum
coin method and show that our technique achieves signif-
icantly higher secret key rate. For simplicity, we assume
that the central node is equidistant to Alice and Bob.
Consequently, we can also assume that the set of states
that Alice prepares is the same to that of Bob. Although
these assumptions are not necessary for our method to
work, they will simplify the calculations greatly.
For the simulations of phase-encoding coherent state
MDI-QKD as well as the decoy-state MDI-QKD, the pa-
rameters that we use are listed in Table I. Parameter 2
will also be used for the simulation of TF-QKD.
TABLE I. List of parameters for numerical simulations.
The different parameters corresponds to different type of de-
tectors commonly used in QKD experiments. Parameter 1
corresponds to the case when avalanche photodiode (APD)
detectors are used. Typically, APD detectors have relatively
high dark count rate pdc and low detector efficiency ηdet. On
the other hand, Parameter 2 corresponds to the case where su-
perconducting nanowire single-photon-detectors (SNSPD) are
used. SNSPDs typically have lower dark count rate and higher
detector efficiency. For all the simulations presented in this
paper, we assume that the single mode fiber has loss coef-
ficient ξ = 0.2dB/km and the overall misalignment error in
the channel eali = 1.5%. Furthermore, we assume that error
corrections can be done at Shannon’s limit. Then, for each
given distance, we optimize the intensity of the signals to get
the highest lower bound on the secret key rate.
pdc ηdet ξ (dB/km) eali
Parameter 1 6.02× 10−6 14.5% 0.20 1.5%
Parameter 2 5× 10−8 85% 0.20 1.5%
A. Phase-encoding coherent state MDI-QKD
We first analyze the phase-encoding coherent state
MDI-QKD protocols. In this protocol, Alice and Bob
independently send non-phase-randomized weak coher-
ent pulses of fixed intensities which are phase-modulated.
The central node would then interfere the signals that
they send using a beam-splitter and then performs single
photon detection on both outputs of the beam-splitter.
When exactly one of the two detectors clicks, Alice and
Bob will be able to learn whether their signals are corre-
lated or anti-correlated. With a simpler architecture and
fewer components and their related flaws, this class of
MDI-QKD protocols can, in principle, provide economic
and high-speed QKD systems. However, they have not
been implemented experimentally due to other technical
challenges such as phase-locking two independent lasers
at a distance. Furthermore, based on the quantum coin
approach, the secret key rate achieved by these protocols
is not favorable. However, the interest in coherent state
MDI-QKD protocols has been revived recently due to
the introduction of twin-field-QKD (TF-QKD) protocols,
also known as phase-matching MDI-QKD [34, 35, 46–49].
Remarkably, TF-QKD enables the distribution of secret
key with rate that overcomes the so-called repeaterless
bound [50, 51] due to single-photon interference. As such,
we foresee that there will be endeavours in implement-
ing phase-locking techniques in QKD systems in the near
future. Furthermore, as we shall see, we can prove that
the secret key rate of coherent state protocols can be sig-
nificantly improved using our method. Interestingly, as
we demonstrate later, the secret key rate phase-encoding
coherent state protocols can even be higher than that of
standard decoy-state MDI-QKD protocols at short dis-
tances. Therefore, it will be interesting to study this
class of protocols.
In Ref. [15], Alice and Bob prepare the states
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FIG. 2. Key rate simulation with (a) APD and (b) SNSPD for generalized phase-encoding coherent state
MDI-QKD. We use our method to compute the lower bound on the secret key rate for the one-basis (blue-dotted curves),
two-basis (red-solid curves) and three-basis protocols (black-dashed curves). As one can see, the curves corresponding to the
three-basis protocol almost coincide with the curves corresponding to the two-basis protocol.
{|±√µ〉, |±i√µ〉} where µ is the mean photon number of
the coherent states. They use the basis {|+√µ〉, |−√µ〉}
to generate key and the basis {|+i√µ〉, |−i√µ〉} for pa-
rameter estimation. On the other hand, the untrusted
central node will announce z ∈ {Ψ+,Ψ−,∅} depending
on whether the outcome of the Bell state measurement
is Ψ+, Ψ− or unsuccessful respectively. Furthermore, to
improve the efficiency of the protocol, whenever the cen-
tral node announces z = Ψ−, Bob will flip the value of
his bit.
We note that in Bell state measurements of coherent
states, the outcome Φ+ cannot be distinguished from the
outcome Ψ+ and similarly, the outcome Φ− cannot be
distinguished from the outcome Ψ− as mentioned in Ref.
[15]. Consequently, there will be intrinsic phase-error
rate even if the bit-error rate is zero. However, the prob-
ability of obtaining Ψ+ and Ψ− is higher than the prob-
ability of obtaining Φ+ and Φ− respectively when the
intensity of the coherent states is small (which is typi-
cally the case for QKD). Hence, we choose to label the
conclusive outcomes as Ψ+ and Ψ−.
Here, we generalize the protocol to allow Alice and
Bob to choose from M possible bases. Thus, the protocol
proposed in Ref. [15] corresponds to the case where M =
2. The case where M = 1 is known in the literature as
the MDI-B92 protocol and was studied in Ref. [52]. In
this section, we will also study the case where M = 3.
For the generalized protocol, Alice and Bob indepen-
dently prepare one of the states of the form
|aa,θx〉 =
∣∣(−1)aeiθx√µ〉∣∣bb,θy〉 = ∣∣(−1)beiθy√µ〉 (9)
where a, b ∈ {0, 1} is her (his) bit value, θx = xpi/M
and θy = ypi/M with x, y ∈ {0, 1, ...,M − 1} as her (his)
choice of basis.
In the following simulations, for each given distance,
we choose the value of the mean photon number µ that
maximize the lower bound on the secret key rate. The
result of the simulation is shown in Fig. 2
Surprisingly, the three-basis protocol does not give
noticeable improvement from the two-basis protocol in
terms of the lower bound on the secret key rate. The in-
tuition behind this is that one can estimate the statistics
of the 4 test states in the three-basis protocol with the 2
test states in the two-basis protocol when we require all
the intensities of the code states to be the same. Inter-
estingly, when we remove that constraint, increasing the
number of test states can give significant improvement in
the secret key rate, as we shall see when we discuss about
TF-QKD later.
To compare our method with the quantum coin
method, we consider the two-basis protocol. Addition-
ally, we will also evaluate the performance of the two
techniques when Eve performs Trojan horse attack on the
sources of Alice and Bob. The Trojan horse attack is exe-
cuted by shining a bright light to Alice’s or Bob’s source.
Some of the light would be reflected and leak some in-
formation to the adversary as it also passes through the
modulator. For the model of the Trojan horse attack, we
extend the model proposed by Ref. [53]. The authors of
Ref. [53] consider Trojan horse attack on prepare-and-
measure QKD but it is rather straightforward to extend
the model to MDI-QKD where Eve attacks both Alice’s
and Bob’s sources. We assume that in executing the Tro-
jan horse attack, Eve injects coherent pulses into Alice’s
and Bob’s sources and they modulate the reflected co-
herent light with intensity ν. In the presence of Trojan
horse attack, the output of Alice’s source can be written
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FIG. 3. Key rate simulation with (a) APD and (b) SNSPD for phase-encoding coherent state MDI-QKD under
Trojan horse attack. We compare the secret key rate obtained using our method (shown by solid curves) with the one
obtained using the quantum coin technique (shown by dashed curves). For the simulation, we assume different intensities of
the leakage light ν (From top to bottom: ν = 10−5 (blue), ν = 10−4 (red) and ν = 10−3 (black)). Comparing the two methods,
we can see that for a given intensity of leakage, the secret key rate computed using our method is consistently higher than the
secret key rate obtained by the quantum coin approach. Furthermore, one can see that the key rate obtained by our method
is more robust against Trojan horse attacks.
as
|a0〉A = |+
√
µ〉A¯ ⊗
∣∣+√ν〉
TA
|a1〉A = |−
√
µ〉A¯ ⊗
∣∣−√ν〉
TA
|a2〉A = |+i
√
µ〉A¯ ⊗
∣∣+i√ν〉
TA
|a3〉A = |−i
√
µ〉A¯ ⊗
∣∣−i√ν〉
TA
(10)
where ν is the intensity of the reflected light. Here, for
simplicity of notation, we replace the pair (a, θx) with
a single index. We assume that the Trojan horse sys-
tem TA is only accessible to Eve and the probability of
a successful Bell state measurement Ppass is not affected
by the Trojan horse attack. The output of Bob’s source
is modeled similarly. The results of the simulations are
shown in Fig. 3.
As we can see from the figure, our method gives a
tighter bound on the secret key rate than the quantum
coin method. This is because the inequality that was
used in the quantum coin approach is, in general, not
tight. On the contrary, our SDP gives an almost tight
approximation of the phase-error rate, owing to the small
duality gap. Furthermore, our method is also more ro-
bust against the Trojan horse attack. This is because
for a given distance, our method predicts higher optimal
intensity than the one predicted by the quantum coin
method. As a result, the ratio of the intensity of the sig-
nal states µ to the intensity of the leaked light ν is higher
when computed with our method. Remarkably, even in
the absence of Trojan horse attack (when ν = 0), our
method gives a significantly higher lower bound on the
secret key rate.
B. Decoy-state MDI-QKD with Trojan horse
attacks
We now consider the decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol
[10]. For concreteness, we consider the time-phase en-
coding but our results can be transferred to other en-
coding scheme such as the polarization encoding. In
this protocol, Alice and Bob randomly modulate the
intensities of their lasers. For each channel use, they
will phase-randomize their laser such that the output of
their sources can be described by Poissonian distribu-
tions of photon number states with different means de-
termined by their respective intensity settings. In the
post-processing step, Alice and Bob then can estimate
the gain and error rate, given their intensity settings. In
turn, they can estimate the single-photon yield and error
rate.
Combined with the measurement-device-independent
architecture which protects us against any detector side-
channel attacks, the decoy-state method [13] prevents a
certain side-channel attack on the sources of Alice and
Bob, namely the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack
[54–56]. The decoy state method uses multiple inten-
sities to approximate the single-photon yield and error
rate, hence revealing PNS attacks when Eve actually per-
forms them. Nevertheless, decoy-state MDI-QKD is still
vulnerable to other attacks on the sources. One possible
attack that Eve can perform with current technology is
the Trojan horse attack. As such, it would be interesting
to study how decoy-state MDI-QKD protocols fare when
subjected to practical Trojan horse attacks.
For simplicity, we follow Ref. [53]’s assumption that
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FIG. 4. Key rate simulation with (a) APD and (b) SNSPD for time-phase-encoding decoy-state MDI-QKD
under Trojan horse attack. We compare the secret key rate obtained using our method (shown by solid curves) with the
one obtained using the quantum coin technique (shown by dashed curves). For the simulation, we assume different intensities
ν for the Trojan horse light. (From top to bottom: ν = 10−5 (blue), ν = 10−4 (red) and ν = 10−3 (black)). Comparing the
two methods, we can see that the secret key rate computed using our method is consistently higher than the secret key rate
obtained by the quantum coin approach. We note that for the simulation with APD, when ν = 10−3, the quantum coin method
fails to obtain any positive key rate.
the Trojan horse attack does not affect the decoy-state
implementation but only leaks the information about
which of the signal states are being prepared by Alice
and Bob. However, we note that our method can also be
applied when the Trojan horse leaks the information of
the decoy setting as discussed in Ref. [57]. Such techni-
cal extension is out of the scope of this paper and will be
left for future work.
To apply our technique to decoy-state MDI-QKD, we
first estimate the single-photon yield Y γ11 as well as the
single-photon quantum bit-error rate (QBER) eγ11 where
γ ∈ {Z,X} denotes the basis choice of Alice and Bob.
Then, we can apply our method to estimate the single-
photon phase-error rate e11ph and hence, the secret key
rate. In the absence of Trojan horse attack, the single-
photon phase-error rate e11ph is simply the single-photon
QBER in the X basis, eX11. Nevertheless, when Eve per-
forms Trojan horse attack, the single-photon phase-error
rate is no longer measured by Alice and Bob and can
only be estimated using techniques like the quantum coin
method or our proposed method. Here, we show that our
method gives a tighter estimation of the single-photon
phase-error rate than the quantum coin method.
Following the model of Ref. [53], Alice’s single-photon
signals when affected by the Trojan horse attack can be
written as
|a0〉A = |0〉A¯ ⊗
∣∣√ν〉
TA
|vac〉T ′A
|a1〉A = |1〉A¯ ⊗ |vac〉TA
∣∣√ν〉
T ′A
|a2〉A = |+〉A¯ ⊗
∣∣∣∣√ν2
〉
TA
∣∣∣∣√ν2
〉
T ′A
|a3〉A = |−〉A¯ ⊗
∣∣∣∣√ν2
〉
TA
∣∣∣∣−√ν2
〉
T ′A
(11)
where {|0〉, |1〉} is the canonical basis and |+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
,
|−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
and |vac〉 is the vacuum state. Bob’s single-
photon signals can be written down in similar fashion.
For the simulation, suppose that two decoy-states are
used alongside the signal state. At the end of the
protocol, Alice and Bob will have an estimate of the
total gain QγµAµB and the total QBER E
γ
µAµB where
µA, µB ∈ {µ, ζ, ω} are the intensity setting of Alice and
Bob respectively. To simulate the statistics observed in
the experiment, we follow Ref. [58]’s model for the total
gain and total QBER. Then, we use the Gaussian elim-
ination method to estimate the single-photon yield and
QBER. Assuming that µ ≥ ζ ≥ ω, the lower bound on
the single-photon yield Y γ,L11 and the upper bound on the
single-photon QBER eγ,U11 is given in Ref. [20]. Other
methods such as linear programming will yield similar
results.
After we obtain Y γ,L11 and e
γ,U
11 , it is straightforward
to apply our method or the quantum coin argument to
lower bound the single-photon phase-error rate e11ph. For
decoy-state protocols, the lower bound on the asymptotic
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FIG. 5. Comparison of the secret key that can be distilled per channel use in decoy-state versus coherent
state MDI-QKD. We compare the secret key rate of time-phase encoding decoy-state and phase-encoding coherent state
MDI-QKD protocols both with and without Trojan horse attack with the simulation parameters that correspond to (a) APD
and (b) SNSPD. When there is no Trojan horse leakages, we can see that the coherent state protocol (shown by red-dash-dotted
curves) has higher secret key rate than the decoy-state protocol (shown by blue-solid curves) at low loss regime (up to around
65 km with APD or around 230 km with SNSPD). Furthermore, when there is a Trojan horse leakage with intensity ν = 10−3,
we see that the decoy-state protocol (shown by black-dotted curves), suffers a more significant reduction in range as compared
to the coherent state protocol (shown by green-dashed curves). This suggests that the coherent state protocol is more robust
against Trojan horse attacks. We reiterate that in simulating the Trojan horse attack on decoy-state protocols, we assume that
the Trojan horse attack does not affect the decoy-state implementation. Once we take into account the effect of Trojan horse
attack on the decoy-state implementation, the key rate of the decoy-state protocol will suffer from an additional reduction due
to the leakages.
secret key rate is given by
R ≥ QZ11[1− h2(e11ph)]−QZµµh2(EZµµ) (12)
where QZ11 = µ
2e−2µY Z11 is the single-photon gain in the
Z basis [10].
Furthermore, we assume that Alice’s and Bob’s inten-
sity modulators that choose the decoy settings have fi-
nite extinction ratio such that the intensity of the second
decoy-state ω cannot be set to zero. In this case, we as-
sume that the intensity of the second decoy-state is 1000
times smaller than that of the signal, i.e. ω = µ/1000.
Thus, for each point, the remaining free parameters in
the optimization are the signal intensity µ and the first
decoy-state intensity ζ. The result of the simulation is
given in Fig. 4.
Referring to Fig. 4, we again see an improvement in the
lower bound on the secret key rate compared to the secret
key rate obtained from the quantum coin technique. This
confirms that our technique is able to give tighter secret
key rate as compared to the quantum coin approach.
Although it is not an entirely fair comparison, one
might be interested to compare the two protocols that
we have analyzed. Fig. 5 gives the superimposed plot
of the key rate of the two protocols. When there are no
leakages, as one would probably guess, the decoy-state
protocol has a longer range than the coherent state pro-
tocol. However, rather surprisingly, we find that at short
distances, the coherent state protocol gives a higher lower
bound on the secret key rate than the decoy-state proto-
col.
A closer inspection reveals that for short distances, the
coherent state protocol has significantly higher probabil-
ity for successful Bell state measurements as compared to
the single-photon gain of the decoy-state protocol. This
is possible because the coherent state protocols rely on
single-photon interference whereas decoy-state protocols
are based on two-photon interference. Therefore, despite
having higher phase-error rate, the coherent state pro-
tocol can give higher secret key rate than the decoy-
state protocol at short distances. Nevertheless, at long
distances, the fact that coherent state protocols have
higher phase-error rate dominates and decoy-state proto-
cols yield higher secret key rate in that regime. Drawing
another connection to TF-QKD, single-photon interfer-
ence is also an important feature of TF-QKD.
Interestingly, the coherent state protocols are more ro-
bust against Trojan horse attacks in the sense that the
range of coherent state protocols suffers less penalty from
Trojan horse attacks as compared to the range of decoy-
state protocols. We also note that since we neglect the
effect of leakages on the decoy-state implementation in
the security analysis, the performance of the decoy-state
protocol would suffer even more when we consider leak-
ages in the intensity settings µA, µB .
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FIG. 6. Key rate simulation for phase-matching MDI-QKD with finite test states for (a) loss-only scenario and
(b) noisy scenario. We compare the secret key rate obtained in phase-matching MDI-QKD with finite number of test states
(represented by solid curves: from top to bottom, green curves for six test states, orange curves for four test states and blue
curves for two test states) against the PLOB bound [51] (represented by red-dashed curves). For completeness, we also plot
the secret key rate when infinite test states are used [35] (represented by black-dotted curve) in the noiseless scenario (pdc = 0,
eali = 0). Remarkably, in the noiseless scenario, two test states are sufficient to overcome the PLOB bound. Furthermore, when
considering the lossless scenario, two test states give almost the same performance as infinite test states.
C. Phase-matching MDI-QKD with finite number
of test states
To demonstrate the versatility of our method, we
will analyze a variant of the recently proposed twin-
field QKD (TF-QKD) protocol called the phase-matching
MDI-QKD [35]. In this protocol, for each round, Alice
and Bob randomly select bases x, y and bit values a, b.
Then, they prepare the corresponding quantum states us-
ing the encoding given in equation (13) and send them to
the central node for Bell state measurement. Note that
Alice and Bob need to share a global phase reference,
just like in the phase-encoding MDI-QKD protocol with
non-phase-randomized coherent state. Consequently, to
implement this protocol, phase-locking is also required.
As mentioned previously, there is a growing interest
in TF-QKD. Indeed, after the original proposal of TF-
QKD protocol [34], other variants of the protocol have
been proposed alongside with their respective security
analyses [35, 46–49]. Remarkably, TF-QKD protocols are
able to overcome the repeaterless bounds [50, 51]. How-
ever, many variants of the TF-QKD protocols (including
the original proposal [34]) require phase-randomization of
two independent phase-locked lasers with the notable ex-
ception of Ref. [35]. There, the protocol uses non-phase-
randomized coherent states which form phase-matching
pairs. However, the results presented in Ref. [35] require
Alice and Bob to send infinitely many coherent states,
leaving the practical case where a finite number of test
states is used as an open problem. Here, we show that a
finite number of test states is indeed enough to overcome
the repeaterless bound.
Remarkably, one can see phase-matching MDI-QKD as
a generalization of the phase-encoding MDI-QKD that
we have considered earlier in Section IV A. There, we
assumed that the signal and test states share the same
intensity. Here, we vary the intensity of different phase-
matching pairs. More explicitly, in this protocol, Alice
and Bob prepare states of the form
|a(ax)〉 =
∣∣(−1)aeiθx√µx〉
|b(by)〉 =
∣∣(−1)beiθy√µy〉 (13)
where θx, θy are defined in similar way as in the phase-
encoding MDI-QKD protocol and now the intensity of
the coherent state depends on which basis Alice and
Bob choose. By optimizing the intensity of each phase-
matching pair, we show that we can overcome the re-
peaterless bound.
For comparison with the Ref. [35]’s result as well as
the repeaterless bound, we will show the ideal perfor-
mance of our protocol, i.e. when there are no dark counts
or misalignment errors. For the repeaterless bound, we
choose the secret key capacity C given in Ref. [51],
also known as the Pirandola-Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi
(PLOB) bound
C = − log2(1− η) (14)
where η is the total transmittivity of the quantum chan-
nel. On the other hand, Ref. [35] proved that the secret
key rate obtained when infinitely many test states are
used in the loss-only scenario, denoted by R¯, is given by
R¯ = (1− e−2µ√η)
[
1− h2
(
1− e−4µ(1−√η)e−2µ√η
2
)]
(15)
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Lastly, it will also be interesting to see how the protocol
fare in the presence of imperfections such as dark counts
and misalignment errors. To that end, we will also use
Parameter 2 of Table I in our simulation. Furthermore,
for fair comparison with PLOB bound, we plot the key
rate against total loss (in dB), which includes the loss in
the detector, instead of treating the loss in the fiber and
in the detector separately. The plots of the key rate for
the ideal and imperfect scenario as well as the PLOB and
the key rate for the ideal infinite test states scenario are
given in Fig. 6. Remarkably, two test states are suffi-
cient to overcome the PLOB bound in the ideal scenario
whereas in the noisy scenario, four test states are suffi-
cient to overcome the PLOB bound. Furthermore, we
emphasize that in our simulation, we use the states with
the structure given by equation (13) and optimize (us-
ing a coarse-grained exhaustive search) the intensity of
each test state. We leave the question of whether opti-
mizing the global phases θx, θy can significantly increase
the secret key rate as an open problem.
V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, we have developed a new numerical tech-
nique to analyze the security of MDI-QKD protocols.
This is done by employing SDP to obtain an almost-
tight upper bound on the phase-error rate, hence the
significant improvement in the distilled secret key rate
compared to the quantum coin method. Additionally,
our method also reveals that phase-encoding coherent
state MDI-QKD might outperform decoy-state MDI-
QKD at short distances. Furthermore, our method is
highly efficient and can be applied to any protocols
with discretely modulated, pure, input states including
continuous-variable MDI-QKD protocols with discrete
modulation [59]. Due to the versatility of our technique,
it can also be applied to MDI-QKD protocols which lack
symmetry. For example, by applying our method to
phase-matching MDI-QKD protocol, we also showed that
the repeaterless bound can be overcome with only a few
test states. It is also interesting to extend the results pre-
sented in this paper to allow mixed input states and to
MDI-QKD networks where we have multiple transmitters
as well as to include finite-key analysis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Jie Lin and Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus for insight-
ful discussions concerning the methods presented in Refs.
[16, 17]. This research is supported by the National
Research Foundation (NRFF11-2019-0001), the National
University of Singapore (R-263-000-D04-731), and the
Asian Office of Aerospace Research and Development
(FA2386-18-1-4033).
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proc. of IEEE Int.
Conf. on Comp., Syst. and Signal Proc., Bangalore, In-
dia, Dec. 10-12, 1984 (1984).
[2] A. K. Ekert, Physical Review Letters 67, 661 (1991).
[3] Security in this context refers to the inaccessibility of
information shared between two parties by any other in-
dividuals.
[4] C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, K. Tamaki, and H.-K. Lo, Physical
Review A 75, 032314 (2007).
[5] B. Qi, C.-H. F. Fung, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma, Quantum
Information and Computation 7, 073 (2007).
[6] Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H.-K. Lo,
Physical Review A 78, 042333 (2008).
[7] F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, New Journal of Physics 12,
113026 (2010).
[8] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, Nature Photonics 4, 686
(2010).
[9] I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurt-
siefer, and V. Makarov, Nature Communications 2, 349
(2011).
[10] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Physical Review Letters
108, 130503 (2012).
[11] S. L. Braunstein and S. Pirandola, Physical Review Let-
ters 108, 130502 (2012).
[12] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin, Physical
Review Letters 68, 557 (1992).
[13] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Physical Review Letters
94, 230504 (2005).
[14] M. Curty, F. Xu, W. Cui, C. C. W. Lim, K. Tamaki, and
H.-K. Lo, Nature Communications 5, 3732 (2014).
[15] K. Tamaki, H.-K. Lo, C.-H. F. Fung, and B. Qi, Physical
Review A 85, 042307 (2012).
[16] P. J. Coles, E. M. Metodiev, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Nature
Communications 7, 11712 (2016).
[17] A. Winick, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and P. J. Coles, Quantum 2,
77 (2018).
[18] K. Tamaki, M. Curty, G. Kato, H.-K. Lo, and K. Azuma,
Physical Review A 90, 052314 (2014).
[19] X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, and M. Razavi, Physical Review
A 86, 052305 (2012).
[20] F. Xu, H. Xu, and H.-K. Lo, Physical Review A 89,
052333 (2014).
[21] A. Rubenok, J. A. Slater, P. Chan, I. Lucio-Martinez,
and W. Tittel, Physical Review Letters 111, 130501
(2013).
[22] Y. Liu, T.-Y. Chen, L.-J. Wang, H. Liang, G.-L. Shentu,
J. Wang, K. Cui, H.-L. Yin, N.-L. Liu, L. Li, X. Ma, J. S.
Pelc, M. M. Fejer, C.-Z. Peng, Q. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan,
Physical Review Letters 111, 130502 (2013).
[23] T. F. Da Silva, D. Vitoreti, G. Xavier, G. Do Amaral,
G. Temporao, and J. Von Der Weid, Physical Review A
88, 052303 (2013).
[24] Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, S.-J. Chen, Y. Liu, W.-J. Zhang,
X. Jiang, L. Zhang, J. Wang, L.-X. You, J.-Y. Guan, D.-
12
X. Yang, Z. Wang, H. Liang, Z. Zhang, N. Zhou, X. Ma,
T.-T. Chen, Q. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan, Physical Review
Letters 113, 190501 (2014).
[25] Z. Tang, Z. Liao, F. Xu, B. Qi, L. Qian, and H.-K. Lo,
Physical Review Letters 112, 190503 (2014).
[26] S. Pirandola, C. Ottaviani, G. Spedalieri, C. Weedbrook,
S. L. Braunstein, S. Lloyd, T. Gehring, C. S. Jacobsen,
and U. L. Andersen, Nature Photonics 9, 397 (2015).
[27] C. Wang, X.-T. Song, Z.-Q. Yin, S. Wang, W. Chen, C.-
M. Zhang, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Physical Review
Letters 115, 160502 (2015).
[28] L. Comandar, M. Lucamarini, B. Fro¨hlich, J. Dynes,
A. Sharpe, S.-B. Tam, Z. Yuan, R. V. Penty, and
A. Shields, Nature Photonics 10, 312 (2016).
[29] Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, Q. Zhao, H. Liu, X.-X. Sun, M.-Q.
Huang, W.-J. Zhang, S.-J. Chen, L. Zhang, L.-X. You,
Z. Wang, Y. Liu, C.-Y. Lu, M. X. Jiang, Xiao, Q. Zhang,
T.-Y. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, Physical Review X 6, 011024
(2016).
[30] H.-L. Yin, T.-Y. Chen, Z.-W. Yu, H. Liu, L.-X. You, Y.-
H. Zhou, S.-J. Chen, Y. Mao, M.-Q. Huang, H. Zhang,
Wei-Jun Chen, M. J. Li, D. Nolan, F. Zhou, X. Jiang,
Z. Wang, Q. Zhang, X.-B. Wang, and J.-W. Pan, Phys-
ical Review Letters 117, 190501 (2016).
[31] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and J. Preskill,
Quantum Information & Computation 4, 325 (2004).
[32] Discretely modulated MDI-QKD are MDI-QKD proto-
cols that involves finite number of different quantum
states sent from Alice and Bob to the untrusted node.
This is in contrast with continuous modulated states (e.g.
Gaussian modulated states), which in practice are always
approximated by a discretely modulated state.
[33] Since Eve’s quantum side information is described by
quantum states, a matrix with elements as the inner-
products of these states, known as a Gram matrix, must
be positive semi-definite.
[34] M. Lucamarini, Z. Yuan, J. Dynes, and A. Shields, Na-
ture 557, 400 (2018).
[35] J. Lin and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Physical Review A 98, 042332
(2018).
[36] M. Christandl, R. Ko¨nig, and R. Renner, Physical Re-
view Letters 102, 020504 (2009).
[37] F. Dupuis, O. Fawzi, and R. Renner, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1607.01796 (2016).
[38] R. Arnon-Friedman, F. Dupuis, O. Fawzi, R. Renner,
and T. Vidick, Nature Communications 9, 459 (2018).
[39] Entanglement swapping is a technique used for distribut-
ing entangled states between two distant parties via a
node between them. By establishing entanglement be-
tween each party and the node, the node could entangle
the quantum states held by the two parties by performing
a Bell-state measurement and announcing the measure-
ment outcome.
[40] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau, R. Jozsa,
A. Peres, and W. K. Wootters, Physical review letters
70, 1895 (1993).
[41] M. Z˙ukowski, A. Zeilinger, M. A. Horne, and A. K. Ek-
ert, Physical Review Letters 71, 4287 (1993).
[42] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Physical Review Letters 85,
441 (2000).
[43] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization
(Cambridge university press, 2004).
[44] Y. Wang, I. W. Primaatmaja, E. Lavie, A. Varvitsio-
tis, and C. C. W. Lim, npj Quantum Information 5, 17
(2019).
[45] I. Devetak and A. Winter, Proceedings of the Royal So-
ciety A: Mathematical, Physical and engineering sciences
461, 207 (2005).
[46] X. Ma, P. Zeng, and H. Zhou, Physical Review X 8,
031043 (2018).
[47] K. Tamaki, H.-K. Lo, W. Wang, and M. Lucamarini,
arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.05511 (2018).
[48] C. Cui, Z.-Q. Yin, R. Wang, W. Chen, S. Wang, G.-
C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Physical Review Applied 11,
034053 (2019).
[49] M. Curty, K. Azuma, and H.-K. Lo, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1807.07667 (2018).
[50] M. Takeoka, S. Guha, and M. M. Wilde, Nature Com-
munications 5, 5235 (2014).
[51] S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani, and L. Banchi,
Nature Communications 8, 15043 (2017).
[52] A. Ferenczi, Security proof methods for quantum key dis-
tribution protocols, Ph.D. thesis, University of Waterloo
(2013).
[53] M. Lucamarini, I. Choi, M. B. Ward, J. F. Dynes,
Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Physical Review X 5, 031030
(2015).
[54] B. Huttner, N. Imoto, N. Gisin, and T. Mor, Physical
Review A 51, 1863 (1995).
[55] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders,
Physical Review Letters 85, 1330 (2000).
[56] N. Lu¨tkenhaus and M. Jahma, New Journal of Physics
4, 44 (2002).
[57] K. Tamaki, M. Curty, and M. Lucamarini, New Journal
of Physics 18, 065008 (2016).
[58] X. Ma and M. Razavi, Physical Review A 86, 062319
(2012).
[59] H.-X. Ma, P. Huang, D.-Y. Bai, T. Wang, S.-Y. Wang,
W.-S. Bao, and G.-H. Zeng, Physical Review A 99,
022322 (2019).
[60] K. Tamaki, M. Koashi, and N. Imoto, Physical Review
Letters 90, 167904 (2003).
13
Appendix A: The phase-error rate of phase-encoding coherent state MDI-QKD
In the main text, we give a general procedure to obtain the expression for the phase-error rate for any MDI-QKD
protocol. Here, we illustrate how this can be done. As a concrete example, we consider the phase-encoding coherent
state MDI-QKD. In the virtual protocol, let the entangled states that Alice and Bob prepare for the key basis be
denoted by
|ΨK〉A′A =
1√
2
[|+〉A′ |√µ〉A + |−〉A′ |−√µ〉A]
|Ψ′K〉B′B =
1√
2
[|+〉B′ |√µ〉B + |−〉B′ |−√µ〉B] (A1)
It is easy to see that measuring the qubit systems in the X-basis is equivalent to sending the states {|√µ〉, |−√µ〉}
randomly. Now, the quantum channel is an isometry U that maps the system AB to EE′ where the register E stores
Eve’s quantum side information and the classical register E′ stores the result of the Bell state measurement. The
states {|Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉} are associated to the respective Bell states, whereas the state |∅〉 is associated to the case where
the Bell state measurement fails to give a conclusive outcome. After the isometry, the global state is given by
|χ〉A′B′EE′ =
1
2
[
|++〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ+++〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−++〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′ +
∣∣e∅++〉E |∅〉E′)
+ |+−〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ++−〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−+−〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′ +
∣∣e∅+−〉E |∅〉E′)
+ |−+〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ+−+〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−−+〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′ +
∣∣e∅−+〉E |∅〉E′)
+ |−−〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ+−−〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−−−〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′ +
∣∣e∅−−〉E |∅〉E′)
]
(A2)
Post-selecting on the successful Bell state measurements,
|χ′〉A′B′EE′ =
1
2
√
Ppass
[
|++〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ+++〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−++〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′
)
+ |+−〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ++−〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−+−〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′
)
+ |−+〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ+−+〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−−+〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′
)
+ |−−〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ+−−〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−−−〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′
)]
(A3)
Let the target state be |Ψ+〉A′B′ . Conditioned on the outcome of the Bell state measurement, Bob applies the
following correction on his qubit:
• z = Ψ+: apply IB′
• z = Ψ−: apply ZB′
where I is the identity operator and {X,Y,Z} are the usual Pauli operators. After the corrections, the global state
becomes
|χ′′〉A′B′EE′ =
1
2
√
Ppass
[
|++〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ+++〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−+−〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′
)
+ |+−〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ++−〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−++〉)E∣∣Ψ−〉E′)
+ |−+〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ+−+〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−−−〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′
)
+ |−−〉A′B′
(∣∣∣eΨ+−−〉
E
∣∣Ψ+〉
E′ +
∣∣∣eΨ−−+〉
E
∣∣Ψ−〉
E′
)]
(A4)
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Since the target state is the state |Ψ+〉A′B′ and key is extracted by Alice and Bob by performing X-measurement
on each of their qubits, the phase-error rate can be computed by using
〈YA′ ⊗ YB′〉 = 1− 2eph (A5)
where 〈YA′ ⊗ YB′〉 is simply
1
2Ppass
(
Re
[〈
eΨ
−
++
∣∣∣eΨ−−−〉+ 〈eΨ++−∣∣∣eΨ+−+〉]− Re [〈eΨ+++∣∣∣eΨ+−−〉+ 〈eΨ−+−∣∣∣eΨ−−+〉]
)
(A6)
and therefore, we have
eph =
1
2
+
1
4Ppass
Re
[〈
eΨ
+
++
∣∣∣eΨ+−−〉− 〈eΨ−++∣∣∣eΨ−−−〉− 〈eΨ++−∣∣∣eΨ+−+〉+ 〈eΨ−+−∣∣∣eΨ−−+〉] (A7)
Thus, we obtain the phase-error rate of the phase-encoding coherent state MDI-QKD protocol. The phase-error rate
of other protocols can be obtained through a similar procedure.
Appendix B: Security analysis of MDI-QKD via the quantum coin technique
Here, we summarize the quantum coin technique presented in [15]. Consider a protocol where Alice (Bob) sends the
state {|a0〉A, |a1〉A} ({|b0〉B , |b1〉B}) to generate key and the state {|a2〉A, |a3〉A} ({|b2〉B , |b3〉B}) to test the channel.
We define the following states ∣∣ΦAx 〉 = 1√
2
[
|+〉A′ |a0〉A + |−〉A′ + |a1〉A
]
∣∣ΦAy 〉 = 1√
2
[
|+i〉A′ |a3〉A + |−i〉A′ + |a2〉A
]
∣∣ΦBx 〉 = 1√
2
[
|+〉B′ |b0〉B + |−〉B′ + |b1〉B
]
∣∣ΦBy 〉 = 1√
2
[
|+i〉B′ |b3〉B + |−i〉B′ + |b2〉B
]
(B1)
Now, consider a virtual protocol where Alice has an access to a quantum coin living in Hilbert space C. Furthermore,
the entangled state describing the joint system of the coin, Alice’s states and Bob’s states, after taking into account
sifting, is given by
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[
|0〉C
∣∣ΦAx 〉∣∣ΦBx 〉+ |1〉C∣∣ΦAy 〉∣∣ΦBy 〉
]
(B2)
In this virtual protocol, the basis choice is made via a Z-measurement on the quantum coin C. It is sufficient to consider
a single quantum coin system since the sifting step discards those events where Alice and Bob choose different bases.
The phase-error rate, eph, is defined as the error-rate when Alice and Bob measure their the systems A
′B′ in the
Y-basis, given that they send the states |ΦAx 〉|ΦBx 〉. However, the quantity that is measured in the actual protocol
is the bit-error in the Y-basis, denoted by ey, which is defined as the error-rate when Alice and Bob measure the
systems A′B′ in the Y-basis, given that they send the states |ΦAy 〉|ΦBy 〉. Intuitively, if |ΦAx 〉|ΦBx 〉 is close to |ΦAy 〉|ΦBy 〉
(i.e. when the basis-dependent flaw is small), ey will be close to eph. This is quantitatively measured by the bias of
the quantum coin when measured in the X-basis. We define ∆ as the probability of obtaining |−〉C when we measure
the quantum coin in the X-basis. Since the bias can be enhanced by the adversary by exploiting the failed Bell state
measurements, the worst case scenario is when ∆ is upper bounded by
∆ ≤ ∆init/Ppass (B3)
where ∆init is defined as
∆init =
1− 〈ΦAx ∣∣ΦAy 〉〈ΦBx ∣∣ΦBy 〉
2
(B4)
15
By applying the so-called Bloch sphere bound [60], we have the following inequality
1− 2∆ ≤ √eyeph +
√
(1− ey)(1− eph) (B5)
After some algebra, we can re-write the inequality such that we have an upper bound on eph, we have
eph ≤ ey + 4∆(1−∆)(1− 2ey) + 4(1− 2∆)
√
∆(1−∆)ey(1− ey) (B6)
Therefore, we can lower bound the secret key rate by plugging in equation (B6) to the following bound
R ≥ Ppass
[
1− h2(eph)− h2(ex)
]
(B7)
